Abe, Moon seek stronger U.N. action against N Korea

To: Whom it May Concern:                                                                                      Date: 4 Sept 2017

Subject: North Korean Weapons-of Mass-Destruction (WMD).

Dear Mr. President

It is unlikely that long-standing issues between North Korea and the U.S. can be resolved through negotiation. Any effort to force North Korea to open to outside influences invites regime change; for Pyongyang, change invites self-destruction. Some level of force may necessary. Knowing where to apply that force is more likely to achieve U.S. desires rather than inviting a prolonged, and devastating war. As present, the intelligence community (IC) can offer no options, however, options do exist. This letter is intended to make you aware of such options.

Fifteen years ago I served as a senior intelligence consultant on a special access program (a “black program);” the organization was one of many established in the wake of 9-11 to confront Al Qaeda, and locate bin Laden. A Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)), with my assignment to the team, the group transitioned from the search for bin Laden, to an investigation of North Korea’s WMD program: Biological, Chemical, Computers, Nuclear and Missiles. I was specifically charged to “be the biggest pain in the ass possible to the intelligence community to force it to confront the most imminent issue facing the U.S.; the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide.” I was told that the program’s change in direction was “a direct response to the State of the Union address given by U. S. President George W. Bush on 29 January 2002 and his description of North Korea as part of the ‘axis of evil.’

Over the next five years, the group, identified much of Pyongyang’s overt and clandestine uranium enrichment facilities to include:

·       Nearly all of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program (production facilities, storage facilities, mines, R&D).

·       Most of their clandestine plutonium production facilities.

·       The transit points where North Korea ships materials in and out of the country (the threat of terrorism).

·       How the program is divided into several geographic areas of the country - containing older and newer parts of the program – uranium and plutonium facilities, etc.

·       Their efforts to proliferate this knowledge outward; Iraq, Iran, Burma, Pakistan.

·       Their R&D facilities.

·       Their initial weapons storage facilities in Pyongyang.

·       Their deployment of weapons to the field (locations in North Korea).

·       At least nine of their weapons storage locations.

·       Several possible locations for the operation of clandestine reactors.

·       The reason why North Korea’s electrical power grid appeared to collapse in 1990 and how the country clandestinely diverted its electrical power resources into its uranium enrichment program.

o  This explained their famine of the mid-1990s (the Arduous March) and why they let it occur.

§ Costing the world much in terms of food aid to keep the country going while its leadership built an offensive nuclear weapons capability.

The results of our analysis were instrumental in overturning the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate.

Our efforts then became the focus of unfavorable examinations conducted by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC). Our effort threatened the status quo. Our effort revealed years, if not decades of poor performance and intellectual dishonesty within the IC.

Outside groups, such as the JASON advisory group, an independent group of elite scientists which advises the United States government on matters of science and technology, commended our effort to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and recommended its continuation. JASON considered our methodologies to be the “most promising to date in the effort to locate and identify North Korea’s uranium enrichment and clandestine nuclear weapons development program.”  The Department of Energy’s (DOE) national laboratories concurred with JASON recommendations. Incapable, by law, to continue the effort as more than an experimental process, the Office of the Secretary of Defense was forced to end the project, out brief and recommend its continuation to the IC.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst present at that out brief, noted the project’s existence, the comments of the JASON group, and the recommendations of DOE national laboratories; but declined to adopt the project’s methodologies, findings and recommendations. The project ended. Its legacy was ignored.

The functions, facilities and installations identified by the program were discounted by the IC and cold-shouldered. Knowledge of North Korea’s actual program, facilities, installations and weapons storage facilities haunts those involved. Due to prior inaction and a lack of competence on the part of the IC, news reports suggest there are no options available for the U.S. in dealing with North Korea. I argue that there are a plethora of options. None of which have ever been explored by the IC.

I believe it is possible to deal with North Korea’s nuclear capability successfully, either through preemption; a retaliatory attack as a crisis develops, or on ground that the U.S. chooses, when and where America desires. I warn however that no successful outcome can be expected if the functions, facilities and installations the group I worked with previously identified, are not confronted in a manner similar to that planned for Yongbyon and other do-nothing targets as currently proposed by the IC

My experience with the IC leaves me convinced that community lacks the ability to confront this issue honestly and directly. Lacking some greater awakening; to strike the target set as presently developed by the IC leaves the majority of Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities intact, inviting North Korean retaliation against China, Japan and Russia – and America bearing all responsibility.

Late last year, I filed a complaint at the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Inspectors General (IG) DoD IG to have unheard previous issues raised through 2015 heard. My complaint was actually written by the DoD IG.  This complaint was delegated by a DoD IG then confronting accusations of Russian involvement in U.S. elections, downward to DIA where I received a call from an agent of that agency. That agent laughed off the issue.

Over the past months I have contacted the offices of Congressmen Barr, Gowdy and Nunez who advised me to contact House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). I left messages on each phone system supporting the HPSCI for over one month. My calls were never returned. Since then I have attempted to work through informal channels with former high-ranking intelligence officials; to include a former Director of DIA, a former Deputy Assistant for Intelligence Analysis at the Central Intelligence Agency, and others were I was told that the “problem was too big” for them to correct without the assistance of Congress.

A military confrontation between the U.S. and North Korea; or a preemptive strike by the U.S. against that country, multi- or unilaterally, is likely to occur within the next few years. U.S. success in definitively destroying North Korea’s WMD capabilities and its potential for counterstrike, rests entirely upon the information received; that information being accurately assessed, and converted into actionable targets. Anything less than 90% surety invites counterattack. The U.S. intelligence community has to date, failed to accurately interpret and convert the information received into actionable intelligence. Initiating action with less-than accurate intelligence of North Korea’s nuclear weapons cycle will result in the death of millions; primarily Chinese, Japanese and Koreans. Another Pearl Harbor, another 9-11 lies just around the corner.

The choices are; do nothing; negotiate from a point of no knowledge, negotiate from a point of in-depth knowledge; preemption or war based upon inaccurate information resulting in the death of many, many millions, preemption or war from an accurate knowledge base resulting in the death of millions.

Consideration of this information is requested.

Dwight R. Rider

(540-842-4813)

 

Mailing List:

To: The Executive Branch

President: Donald Trump

Vice President: Mike Pence

Secretary of State: Rex Tillerson

Secretary of Defense: James Mattis

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Joseph Dunford

National Security Advisor: H.R. McMaster

Deputy National Security Advisor: Ricky L. Waddell

Attorney General: Jeff Sessions

White House Chief of Staff:

Secretary of the Army

Secretary of the Navy

Secretary of the Air Force

Chief of Staff of the Army

Chief of Staff of the Navy

Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps

Chief of Staff of the Air Force

Chief of Staff PACOM

Chief of Staff United States Forces Japan

Chief of Staff United States Forces Korea

 

Governor’s Office of Kentucky:

 

To: Member of the United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Mike Conaway, Texas

Rick Crawford, Arkansas

Trey Gowdy, South Carolina

Will Hurd, Texas

Peter King, New York

Frank LoBiondo, New Jersey

Devin Nunes, California, Chair

Chris Stewart, Utah

Elise Stefanik, New York

Tom Rooney, Florida

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Florida

Mike Turner, Ohio

Brad Wenstrup, Ohio

 

Others

              John Bolton

Stop all trade with China? Hah, that's a good joke. That will never happen.

What could develop into a trade war with China would still not get NK to give up their nuclear program, but it will have world wide economic consequences....all bad.

Trump on Sunday threatened to halt trade with "any country doing business with North Korea" in the wake of Pyongyang's sixth nuclear test.

Do it, Trump! It would hurt us (USA) a lot, but it would hurt NK's supporters (※cough cough※ China) a lot more.